|
In economics, the hold-up problem is central to the theory of incomplete contracts, and shows the difficulty in writing complete contracts. A hold-up problem arises when two factors are present: #Parties to a future transaction must make non-contractible relationship-specific investments before the transaction takes place. #The specific form of the optimal transaction (e.g. quality-level specifications, time of delivery, what quantity of units) cannot be determined with certainty beforehand.〔Rogerson, W.P. (1992). Contractual Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem. ''The Review of Economic Studies, 4''(59), 777-793. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/2297997〕 The hold-up problem is a situation where two parties may be able to work most efficiently by cooperating, but refrain from doing so due to concerns that they may give the other party increased bargaining power, and thereby reduce their own profits. When party A has made a prior commitment to a relationship with party B, the latter can ‘hold up’ the former for the value of that commitment. The hold-up problem leads to severe economic cost and might also lead to underinvestment. == Underinvestment == It is often argued that the possibility of a hold-up can lead to underinvestment in relation-specific investment, and, hence, inefficiency. Underinvestment occurs because investors cannot guarantee themselves a sufficient share of the return through ex post bargaining.〔Ellingsen, T., & Johannesson, M. (2004). Is There a Hold-Up Problem? ''The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 3''(106), 475-494. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/3441120〕 Consequently, predictions of the outcome are very sensitive to assumptions made about the bargaining process. The bargaining process can be seen as a game with multiple equilibria. Underinvestment may occur only when the agent fails to coordinate on an efficient equilibrium.. 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Hold-up problem」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
|